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ERP Investment: Business Impact and Productivity Measures 
 
LORIN M. HITT, D.J. WU AND XIAOGE ZHOU 
 
ABSTRACT: Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software system integrates key 
business and management processes within and beyond a firm’s boundary. While the 
business value of ERP implementations have been extensively debated in IT trade 
periodicals in the form of qualitative discussion or detailed case studies, there is little 
large sample statistical evidence on who adopts ERP and whether the benefits of ERP 
implementation exceed the costs (and risks).  
 
With multi-year multi-firm ERP implementation and financial data, it is found that larger 
firms (and those with slightly better performance) tend to invest in ERP. Even though 
there is a slowdown in business performance and productivity shortly after the 
implementation, financial markets consistently reward the adopters with higher market 
valuation (as measured by Tobin’s q). Due to the lack of mid- and long-term post 
implementation data, future research on the long run impact of ERP is proposed.  
 
KEY WORDS AND PHRASES: ERP systems, ROI, productivity analysis.      
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I.  Introduction 
 
Enterprise Resource Planning software systems (ERP) encompass a wide range of 
software products supporting day-to-day business operations and decision-making.  ERP 
serves many industries and numerous functional areas in an integrated fashion, 
attempting to automate operations from supply chain management, inventory control, 
manufacturing scheduling and production, sales support, customer relationship 
management, financial and cost accounting, human resources and almost any other data-
oriented management process. ERP systems have become increasingly prevalent over the 
last 10 years.  The license/maintenance revenue of ERP market was $17.2 billion dollars 
in 1998, it is expected to be $24.3 billion dollars in 2000, and ERP systems have been 
implemented in over 60% of multi-national firms (PriceWaterhouseCoppers, 1999).  This 
market also cuts across industries – for example, two of the world’s best-known software 
companies, IBM and Microsoft, now run most of their business on software neither of 
them makes, the SAP R/3 ERP package made by SAP AG (O’Leary, 2000). 
  
The appeal of the ERP systems is clear.  While most organizations typically had software 
systems that performed much of the component functions of ERP, the standardized and 
integrated ERP software environment provides a degree of interoperability that was 
difficult and expensive to achieve with standalone, custom-built systems.  For example, 
when a salesperson enters an order in the field, the transaction can immediately flow 
through to other functional areas both within and external to the firm.  The order might 
trigger an immediate change in production plans, inventory stock levels or employees’ 
schedules, or lead to the automated generation of invoices and credit evaluations for the 
customer and purchase orders from suppliers.  In addition to process automation, the 
ability of ERP systems to disseminate timely and accurate information also enables 
improved managerial and worker decision-making.  Managers can make decisions based 
on current data, while individual workers can have greater access to information, 
enabling increasing delegation of authority for production decisions as well as improved 
communications to customers (O’Leary, 2000). 
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Implementation of ERP systems requires a substantial investment in time, money and 
internal resources (Bailey, 1999; White, Clark and Ascarelli, 1997) and is fraught with  
technical and business risk (Austin and Cotteleer, 1999).  A typical ERP installation has a 
total cost of about $15 million (O’Leary, 2000, p. 6) and costs can be as high as 2-3% of 
revenues (Escalle, Cotteleer, and Austin, 1999).  Installation takes between 1 and 3 years 
(21 months on average), with benefits starting to accrue in an average of 31 months 
(McAfee, 1999; O’Leary, 2000).  ERP implementations are also known to be unusually 
difficult, even when compared to other large-scale systems development projects.  Part of 
this difficulty is due to the pervasiveness of the changes associated with ERP, the need 
for simultaneous process redesign of multiple functional areas within the firm, and the 
need to adapt processes to the capabilities of the software.1  There is also a high degree of 
managerial complexity of these projects.  While ERP systems are packaged software 
applications, the majority (~60%) of project cost is devoted to setup, installation and 
customization of the software, services typically provided by outside consultants such as 
Andersen Consulting or EDS (Dolmetsch et al., 1998; Oesterle, Fleisch and Alt, 2000).2  
Success or failure hinges on the effective collaboration among these teams, the business 
knowledge of internal business experts and the technical skills of outside IT consultants 
(Oesterle, Feisch and Alt, 2000). Numerous cases document ERP implementation failures 
(Davenport, 1998; Martin, 1998), some with disastrous results.3     
 
Given the scale of ERP implementation projects as well as the possibility for both large 
successes and failures, it is reasonable to expect that ERP deployment have a significant 
and measurable effect on firm performance. While both costs and potential benefits are 
                                                           
1 Thomas Van Weelden, CEO of Allied Waste, noted one of the primary concerns for abandoning their 
SAP implementation was, “They [SAP] expect you to change your business to go with the way the 
software works”   (Bailey, 1999). 
2 For a typical ERP project cost breaks down as follows:  Software Licensing (16%), Hardware (14%), 
Consulting (60%), training and other internal staff costs (10%). 
3 The SAP-Siebel-Manugistics implementation at Hershey was three months behind schedule, and Hershey 
officials offered this late implementation as partial explanation for why Hershey missed 10% of its 
expected earnings (Branch, 1999). Geneva Steel (O’Leary, 2000, pp. 39 – 48, 219) declared bankruptcy the 
day after their $8 million SAP system was implemented. FoxMeyer (a 7-billion-dollar company) planned 
$65 million for their SAP implementation; it claimed in litigation that SAP was one of the reasons that it 
had gone bankrupt, and it is suing both SAP and Andersen Consulting (Radosevich, 1998). It is estimated 
that at least 90% of ERP implementations end up late or over budget (Martin, 1998). 
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high, it is not clear whether the net effect results in higher productivity for the firm.  In 
addition, because implementation is a difficult and uncertain process, firms that are 
successful in implementing ERP may gain competitive advantage over other firms that 
are unwilling or unable to make similar changes.  
 
To date, most of the documentation of the benefits of ERP has been in the form of 
individual case studies (e.g., Dolmetsch, et al., 1998; Cotteleer, Austin, and Nolan, 1998; 
McAfee, 1999; Gibson, Holland, and Light, 1999; Westerman et al., 1999), product 
testimonials (SAP Press Release) and industry surveys (AT Kearney, 1996, 1998, 2000; 
MSDW CIO Surveys on Enterprise Software, 1999 - 2001).  In this paper, we 
systematically study the productivity and business performance effects of ERP using a 
unique dataset on firms that have purchased licenses for the SAP R/3 system, the most 
widely adopted ERP package.  Our goal is to better understand the economics of ERP 
implementations specifically, and more broadly, contribute to the understanding of the 
benefits of large-scale systems projects. 
 
II.  Literature Review 
 
This work draws on two streams of previous literature:  the work on the business value of 
information technology and the more specialized literature on the value of ERP 
implementations.  In this section, we briefly survey each of these areas as they apply to 
our analysis. 
 
II. A.  Business Value of Information Technology 
 
There is an extensive literature investigating the business impact of information 
technology (IT) using a wide variety of methodologies and different levels of analysis.  
While work at the economy-wide level has typically shown equivocal results until very 
recently (see e.g., Oliner and Sichel, 1994), research at the firm-level has demonstrated 
that information technology investment has a significant effect on productivity levels, 
productivity growth, and stock market value of firms (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000).  
 5
Other research has also found some positive effects on internal performance metrics such 
as inventory turnover (Barua, Kriebel and Mukhopadhyay, 1995). 
 
While much is known about the general effect of information technology on productivity, 
there is less understanding of the value of specific information technology applications 
and the factors that make a particular project or system more effective.  Previous studies 
found that IT automation of postal sorting and toll collection had a significant effect on 
productivity (Mukhopadhyay, Rajiv and Srinivasan, 1997; Mukhopadhyay, Lerch and 
Mangal, 1997).  Benefits were also found in research of the plant level for automated 
machine tools (Kelley, 1994) and for “advanced manufacturing technologies”, most of 
which are computer-related (Doms, Dunne and Troske, 1997).  Brynjolfsson, Hitt and 
Yang (2000) found that certain organizational practices such as the increased use of 
skilled workers and decentralized and team-based organizational structures increased the 
value of IT investments.  Using survey data, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1995) found that 
firms that invested more heavily in business process redesign and devoted more of their 
IT resources to increasing customer value (e.g. quality, timeliness, convenience) had 
greater productivity and business performance.  All of this research suggests that there 
can be positive benefits from the automation, process redesign activities and increased 
timeliness or output quality associated with successful ERP system deployment, although 
these effects in the specific context of ERP have not been previously studied statistically. 
 
II.B.  Impact of ERP Implementation 
 
There is a small but growing literature on the impact of ERP systems; the majority of 
these studies are interviews, cases studies or a collection of case studies and industry 
surveys (see e.g. McAfee and Upton, 1996; Davenport, 1998; Ross, 1998; AT Kearney, 
1996, 1998, 2000; MSDW CIO Surveys on Enterprise Software, 1999 - 2001). McAfee 
(1999) studied the impact of ERP systems on self-reported company performance based 
on a survey of 101 US implementers of SAP R/3 packages. Participating companies 
reported substantial performance improvement in several areas as a result of their ERP 
implementation, including their ability to provide information to customers, cycle times, 
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and on-time completion rates. Gattiker and Goodhue (2000) group the literature of ERP 
benefits into four categories: (1) improve information flow across sub-units, 
standardization and integration facilitates communication and better coordination; (2) 
enabling centralization of administrative activities such as account payable and payroll; 
(3) reduce IS maintenance costs and increase the ability to deploy new IS functionality; 
(4) ERP may be instrumental in moving a firm away from inefficient business processes 
and toward accepted best of practice processes. A model based on organizational 
information processing theory (Galbraith, 1974) has been developed to explain the costs 
and benefits of ERP impact and validated using two case studies. They argue that some 
successfully transformed firms (the “swans”) would enjoy these ERP benefits, however, 
others (the “ducks”) might not be able to benefit from such ERP implementation due to 
firm- and site-specific differences (Gattiker and Goodhue, 2000).   
 
The above studies on the impact of ERP systems suggest that there are potentially 
substantial benefits for firms that successfully implemented ERP systems, though there is 
little in terms of broad sample statistical evidence (Ragowsky and Somers, 2000). We 
note here the significance of ERP impact has started to attract more attention from the 
academics, a few special issues of leading academic journals have been edited or 
forthcoming (e.g., Gable and Vitale, 2000; Sarkis and Gunasekaran, 2001).  
 
III. Data, Methods and Hypotheses 
 
III. A.  Data 
 
Our analysis leverages and extends existing data on information technology, productivity 
originally used by Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) for the study of IT and productivity 
growth.4  We combine this database on IT and other financial measures with new data on 
the adoption of ERP by large firms.  Throughout this study, large firms are defined as 
                                                           
4 These data have been used for related work by Brynjolfsson and Yang (1998); Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson 
and Hitt (2000) and Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2000). 
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either all publicly traded firms on Compustat or the Fortune 1000. Details on each of 
these data sources appear below. 
  
III. A. 1.  ERP Adoption 
 
Our primary data and unique data source is a record of all license agreements for the SAP 
R/3 system sold by SAP America over the time period 1986 to 1998 – this is essentially a 
sales database used to record the number of licenses sold.  When a firm purchases a 
license from SAP, pricing is based on the number of “seats” (in addition to an up front 
basic license fee), which represent the number of simultaneous users that the system will 
support.  The SAP system is modular, in the sense that each of the functional modules 
(e.g., production planning, sales and distribution, financial accounting, human resources) 
can be installed or not at the firms’ discretion without additional licensing fees, but SAP 
does track which modules are installed. 
 
Our data includes the name of the firm that purchased the license, the location where the 
system was installed, the date of the original purchase, the date the installation was 
completed and the system went live, and the modules that are active for each location. 
While there are over 40 modules or variations of modules in the system, they can be 
broadly grouped into 5 primary areas:  manufacturing, finance, human resources, project 
management, and information systems.5   We will utilize these groupings for some of our 
analyses.  The data is maintained at the level of individual sites, while our other data is at 
the level of the firm – we therefore aggregate the data to the firm level for many of our 
analysis (details of the aggregation are specific to each analysis and will be described 
later).  We then match the aggregate data to Compustat and the Computer Intelligence 
database (described below).  This necessarily limits the analysis to firms that are publicly 
traded in the US, but using this method we are able to match 70% of all firms in the 
database. 
 
                                                           
5 The information systems module includes application protocol interface (APIs) and other basis 
components, database products, business information warehousing and related data mining technologies. 
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Although these data have not been previously available to academic researchers and thus 
have not been validated in previous work, these data are used for real operational 
decisions at SAP and we therefore believe that they are extremely accurate in terms of 
covering all SAP sales.  However, there are a number of concerns about using these data 
for the analysis of ERP adoption and performance.  Probably the most serious issue is 
that we only have adoption data for SAP, but not for other ERP vendors.  Given that SAP 
has over 75% of the ERP market today (higher historically) at large firms (see the annual 
report of SAP America, 1996 and other sources6), we are confident that we capture most 
of the ERP installations.  However, when we do comparisons between adopters and the 
relevant population of firms (either all publicly traded firms on Compustat or the Fortune 
1000) there will be firms that are adopters of other ERP packages.  If we assume that the 
benefits of the different ERP packages are similar across vendors, this type of data error 
will tend to diminish the apparent differences between our measured adopters and non-
adopters, biasing our model coefficients toward zero.  Thus, care must be made in 
interpreting insignificant results as lack of effect is not completely distinguishable from 
data error.  However, some large firms implementing SAP R/3 also implement other ERP 
packages to take advantage of the “best-of-breed” of different vendors, suggesting that 
our data set might closely approximate the majority of ERP implementers though not 
necessarily the extent of implementation.  This limitation is less of a difficulty for the 
portions of our analysis that are restricted to SAP adopters only, although the issue of 
adoption of competing packages is still a concern. 
 
A second concern is data matching.  Our unit of analysis is the firm level, yet a firm may 
only partially adopt the R/3 system in several ways.  They may only deploy the system in 
some but not all physical locations, and they may only deploy a small subset of the 
system in any given installation.  We therefore examine both the adoption decision 
generally (buy SAP R/3 or not) as well as the extent of adoption by examining which 
                                                           
6 A presentation by SAP executives in 1996 gives the following detailed information about the user of SAP 
R/3 in America’s Fortune 500 companies: 6 out of the top 10 American companies; 7 out of the 10 most 
profitable companies; 9 out of the 10 companies with the highest market value; 7 out of the top 10 
pharmaceutical, computer, and petroleum companies; 6 out of the top 10 electronics companies; 8 out of 
the top 10 chemical and food companies. These numbers have been increased since then (Source: SAP 
America’s annual reports, 1996 - 1998).  
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modules were implemented.  Unfortunately, we are unable to measure “seats” sold due to 
idiosyncrasies on how the sales data are kept at SAP, making it difficult to estimate 
further the extent of firm-level utilization.  There are also some data matching problems 
with firms that operate internationally so we have also performed robustness checks 
including and excluding installations at non-US subsidiaries with similar results.  Finally, 
a firm may implement part but not all of the system.  For our purposes this creates a 
measurement advantage because it enables comparisons of the value of different modules 
as well as the gains (if any) of exploiting the modularity of the product versus 
implementing individual modules in a standalone fashion. 
 
III. A. 2. Financial Performance 
 
We utilize Standard and Poor’s Compustat II database to construct various measures 
necessary to calculate productivity, stock market valuation and firm performance using 
standard approaches utilized in previous work on productivity generally (Hall, 1990) and 
specifically the business value of IT (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; Hitt and Brynjolfsson, 
1996;  Brynjolfsson and Yang, 1999).  Details on the data construction are provided in 
Table 1.    Measures are constructed for firm value-added, capital stock, labor input, 
industry, total stock market valuation, size, debt-equity ratios, and a number of standard 
performance ratios such as return on equity, return on assets and other accounting ratios 
such as inventory turnover rate (see Section IV for more details). 
 
III. A. 3.  IT Use 
 
In some analyses, we utilize the Computer Intelligence InfoCorp (CII) database for a 
metric of information technology use. CII conducts a telephone survey to inventory 
specific pieces of IT equipment by site for firms in the Fortune 1000 (surveying 
approximately 25,000 sites).  For our study, CII aggregated types of computers and sites 
to get firm-level IT stocks.  They calculated the value of the total capital stock of IT 
hardware (central processors, PCs, and peripherals) as well as measures of the computing 
capacity of central processors in millions of instructions per second (MIPS) and the 
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number of PCs.  The IT data do not include all types of information processing or 
communication equipment and are likely to miss a portion of computer equipment which 
is purchased by individuals or departments without the knowledge of information 
systems personnel or are owned or operated off-site.  The IT data also exclude 
investments in software and applications.  However, for our purposes they are broadly 
indicative of a firm’s overall use of information technology, which, while not perfect, is 
useful for discriminating between high and low users of IT. 
 
III. A. 4.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Our primary data (Compustat and ERP adoption) span the 1986-1998 time period, 
resulting in 24037 firm-years observations for the entire population of firms with valid 
data on all performance metrics and productivity data, including 4069 firm-years of data 
for firms that have implemented one or more SAP modules (including about 350 unique 
firms).  When we restrict the sample to firms that also have complete information 
technology data from computer intelligence, the population is reduced to 5603 firm-years 
with 1117 with SAP implementations. 
 
III. B.  Analytical Methods and Hypotheses 
 
We examine the effect of ERP adoption on productivity, firm performance and stock 
market valuation using several different models that have been applied in previous work 
in IT and productivity (Hitt and Brynjolfsson, 1996; Brynjolfsson and Yang, 1998; 
Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang, 2000).  Using both the cross-section and time series 
component of our data, we can examine the difference in performance of firms (measured 
in a variety of ways) that adopted ERP versus those that did not.  Using the longitudinal 
dimension we can examine the relative performance of firms before, during and after 
implementation to examine how the effect of ERP implementations appears over time.  
Finally, we can use additional data on modules implemented to understand how the 
extent of implementation affects performance. 
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III. B. 1. Empirical Methods: Performance Analysis 
 
We use three basic specifications for the analysis of the performance impact of ERP 
adoption: performance ratios, productivity (production functions), and stock market 
valuation (Tobin’s q). Comparable to common research approaches in the management 
literature and some of the literature on the productivity of IT, we estimate regressions of 
various measures of financial performance.  The general form of the estimating equation 
is: 
 
( ) ( )log log
(1)
performance ratio numerator Intercept performance ratio deno min ator
Adoption Variables Year Controls Industry Controls ε
= + +
+ + +
 
  
We chose to model the numerator of the performance ratio as the dependent variable with 
a control for the denominator on the right hand side.  This has the advantage that it 
provides more flexibility in the relationship between the numerator and denominator 
while retaining the interpretation as a performance ratio.7 Various performance ratios are 
compared as they capture different aspects of firm performance, both in terms of bottom 
line profitability (e.g. return on assets) or measures of firm activities that in turn drive 
performance (such as inventory turnover rate).  We include separate dummy variables for 
each year to capture transitory, economy wide shocks that effect performance.  For 
instance, the time variables remove the upward trend in the stock market that occurred 
over our sample period, thus avoiding possible spurious correlation between stock market 
growth and increasing diffusion of ERP.  We also control for industry (at the “1 ½ digit” 
SIC level)8 to remove variation in performance ratios due to idiosyncratic characteristics 
of the production process of different industries. 
 
                                                           
7 This formulation relies on the property that log(A/B) = log(A) – log(B).  We thus estimate a specification 
that has log(A) = intercept + a1log(B) + other controls.  The other controls retain their interpretation as 
change in the performance ratio and the interpretation is identical if a1=1. 
8 This divides the economy into 10 industries which include:  Mining/Construction, Process Manufacturing, 
High-Tech Manufacturing, Other Durable Manufacturing, Other Non-durable Manufacturing, Wholesale 
Trade, Retail Trade, Transportation, Utilities, Finance and Other Services. 
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These types of analyses have the advantage that they can capture a wide variety of 
different aspects of value and are commonly used in studies that seek to assess firm 
performance.  Their primary disadvantage is that the model specification does not have a 
strong theoretical grounding, and thus should be interpreted as correlations rather than 
estimates of an econometric model.  To avoid these concerns, there are two other 
approaches commonly employed to measure firm performance:  productivity regressions 
and Tobin’s q analysis. 
 
Productivity regressions are based on the economic concept of production functions.  
Firms are assumed to have a production process represented by a functional of f(·) that 
relates output (in our case value-added, which is sales less materials designated as VA) to 
the inputs the firm consumes (capital – K, labor – L).  It is common to also include 
controls for time and industry in this analysis as well.  The most commonly used 
functional form for the production function is the Cobb-Douglas function, which has the 
advantages of both simplicity and empirical robustness for the calculation of performance 
differences (see Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1996 for a discussion of this formulation; Varian, 
1990 discusses general properties of production functions).  In a production function the 
intercept term has a special interpretation, commonly called “multifactor productivity”, as 
the ratio of output to an index of inputs a firm consumes.  To capture differences in 
performance, additional terms can simply be added to the Cobb-Douglas production 
function in its log-log form whose coefficients can be interpreted as percentage 
differences in productivity.  This yields an estimating equation of the following form: 
 
1 2log log log
(2)
VA Intercept Adoption Variables a K a L
Year Controls Industry Controls ε
= + + +
+ + +
 
 
This type of analysis captures productivity impact of various aspects of the adoption 
decision with a somewhat more rigorous foundation than the performance regressions.  
On the other hand, because a production function is a short run measurement framework, 
it may miss some advantages that accrue to the firm over time. That is, while a 
production function will capture productivity changes induced by ERP adoption, it has no 
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way of capturing the future gains (which could substantially exceed the current gains) 
that will accrue to the firm. 
 
An alternative approach is to utilize the stock market to value investments in ERP.  To 
the extent that ERP implementation creates value and that investors are sufficiently 
informed to place some estimate on this value, the stock market will capture the current 
as well as expectations of future benefits that the firm will receive (see a full discussion 
of the interpretation of Tobin’s q in Brynjolfsson and Yang, 1998 and the references 
therein).  In addition, because investor expectations can incorporate intangible benefits of 
IT investment which are not well captured in production function analyses, market value-
based approaches may better capture the total benefit of ERP implementation. As a result, 
analyses of Tobin’s q can often show greater statistical power than approaches that rely 
on production functions (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000).  For our work, we adopt a 
simplified version of the specification of Brynjolfsson and Yang (1997; 1999) that relates 
the market value of the firm to the assets that it uses.  We also include additional terms to 
capture the shifts in overall market value due to ERP adoption, and include time and 
industry dummy variables as before.  Thus, we have: 
 
( ) ( )
)3(
loglog
33
2211
ErrorDummiesIndustryDummiesYearKa
KaKavaluebookVariablesAdoptionerceptIntvaluemarket
+++
+++++=
 
 
It is important to note that all these analyses capture the average benefit of ERP averaged 
over a wide variety of firms and projects.  Clearly, not all projects will be successful, 
while others will succeed well beyond expectations and average performance.  Thus, care 
should be taken in recognizing the interpretation as an average, recognizing that there 
may be substantial variance for individual firms around this value.   
 
III. B. 2.  Empirical Methods:  Incorporating Adoption into Performance Measurement 
 
Our previous discussion suggests that firms that adopt ERP systems should differentiate 
themselves from competitors, due to both the productivity benefits accruing for ERP use 
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as well as an implicit barrier to entry created by the difficulty of successful ERP 
adoption.  On average, if firms were behaving rationally, we would expect the net effect 
of ERP implementation to be non-negative, and strictly positive if indeed barriers to 
adoption are significant.  Our base hypothesis is thus: 
 
H1:  Firms that adopt ERP systems will show greater performance as measured 
by performance ratio analysis, productivity and stock market valuation. 
 
This is implemented empirically by incorporating a dummy variable which is 0 if the firm 
is a non-adopter of ERP over our entire sample period, and 1 if the firm adopts ERP.  We 
explore variants of these specifications by allowing this variable to represent the extent of 
adoption (number of modules, etc.) in addition to the general adoption decision.  Note 
that in this formulation we can identify differences in performance between ERP adopters 
and those that do not, but cannot necessarily distinguish the ERP adoption decision itself 
from other changes that may have occurred concurrently or are otherwise correlated with 
the choice to adopt ERP. 
 
An alternative approach to gauge the value of adoption is rather than comparing the firm 
to the general population, to also compare the firm to itself over time.  This has two 
specific advantages – first it enables better control for firm heterogeneity by looking at 
changes over time (for example, if “good” firms tend to adopt ERP systems for non-
productive reasons, that will still appear as positive benefits in tests of H1).  In addition, 
ERP systems have significant risks and difficulties that are likely to be encountered 
during the implementation process that may make productivity decline during and 
perhaps for some time after the implementation is complete.  Survey work (discussed in 
the introduction) suggested that the payback of ERP investments may not begin to accrue 
for 2 years or more after the implementation has started. In addition, Austin and Cotteleer 
(1999) in their survey of ERP implementation risks found that the magnitude of 
organizational risk and business risk dominate technical risk – thus one might expect 
risks to persist even after the technical component of the project has been completed.  
This suggests a second hypothesis: 
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H2-1: There is a drop in performance during ERP implementation as measured 
using performance ratios and productivity regressions. 
 
H2-2:  There is a continued drop in performance shortly after ERP 
implementation as measured using performance ratios and productivity 
regressions. 
 
Given the recency of our data, as well as the recency of the rapid growth in ERP 
adoption, we are unable to test a logical additional hypothesis that productivity recovers 
and possibly exceeds previous productivity after the implementation is complete since 
our data is sparse following implementation9. However, the stock market data should 
provide a useful indicator of whether or not long run productivity will increase. The 
prediction is clear for the post implementation analysis – firms that successfully complete 
implementation should receive a significant boost in market valuation representing both 
the future gains as well as the successful resolution of implementation risks. The market 
value of the implementation period itself is more uncertain as it includes the offsetting 
effects of potential future gains of a successful implementation against the possibility of 
implementation failure. We therefore (optimistically) hypothesize that: 
 
H3-1:  There is an increase in stock market valuation at the initiation of an ERP 
implementation. 
 
H3-2:  There is an increase in stock market valuation of a firm at the completion 
of ERP implementation. 
 
These hypotheses can be tested by incorporating two additional variables that segment 
the time period for ERP adopters in the performance analysis: 
 
 16
Begin_Impl: is 1 at the year of first ERP implementation and remains 1 
afterwards. It is 0 prior to any implementation.  
 
End_Impl: is 1 at the year when first ERP implementation is finished and remains 
as 1 afterwards.  It is 0 prior to any completion. 
 
Using estimates of the coefficients on these variables we can compute the productivity 
difference during implementation (the direct coefficient on Begin_Impl), the productivity 
after implementation is complete (the sum of the coefficients on Begin_Impl and 
End_Impl) or the difference in productivity from the implementation period to the end of 
implementation (the coefficient on End_Impl).  These estimates can be calculated 
restricting the sample to only firms that are adopters, to get a pure estimate of the change 
in firm productivity or pooled with non-adopters to gain a greater contrast between firms 
in different stages of implementation and non-adopters. 
 
III. B. 3.  Empirical Methods:  Economies of Scope and Scale in ERP Adoption 
 
It is believed that different functional modules of ERP package will work out in harmony 
if all implemented. Functional modules from the same vendor are strongly preferred due 
to reduced integration cost across disparate functional modules. In addition, tight 
integration of the various functional modules allows a greater degree of process 
automation of routine tasks as well as more comprehensive data analysis and reporting 
capabilities to improve discretionary management decisions. Indeed, the key selling point 
of ERP versus a collection of functionally specific specialized applications is the value of 
enterprise-wide software integration. 
 
However, at some level it is also possible that diseconomies set in – greater 
implementation risk, larger support costs, hardware costs and other technical constraints 
(especially response times) may hinder the successful use of the application.  At greater 
                                                                                                                                                                             
9An example would be the follow-up story of SAP-Siebel-Manugistics implementation at Hershey, as 
footnoted previously, where benefits have been regained in the long-run. Private communication with a 
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level of integration, minor user errors can rapidly propagate and have enterprise-wide 
effects. To capture the extent of implementation we examine which modules the firm 
implemented, using our broad grouping of all modules into the five major categories 
(manufacturing, finance, project management, human resources, and information 
systems). 
 
Ideally, one would like to use a general externally validated classification system to 
capture the extent of implementation. Unfortunately, the only relevant system, the APICS 
ABCD classification for conventional MRP performance measures (e.g., Moustakis 
2000), is not readily applicable for this analysis since we have both manufacturing and 
service firms (which typically do not have manufacturing or inventory management 
issues).  In addition, according to the APICS ABCD classification for MRP systems, all 
the manufacturing firms (except one firm who only implemented the inventory 
management module) on our sample would be at the same level (i.e., Class A) since they 
implemented ERP10.  As a result, we chose to develop a classification system based on 
the actual patterns of usage of the various SAP modules. An analysis of patterns of 
implementation in these data shows that the vast majority of firms (>90%) implement one 
of four common module combinations which we will label as different implementation 
Levels.  We describe a firm that has implemented any single module or an unusual 
combination of two modules as Level 0 – this applies to less than 10% of the firms.  
Firms that implement the core manufacturing, finance and IS modules are Level 1.  Those 
that have Level 1 functionality that also implement project management are Level 2A and 
those that have Level 1 functionality that also implement the human resources module are 
Level 2B.  Finally firms that implement all five categories of modules are Level 3.  Using 
this system we can describe our remaining hypotheses: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
team member of the Hershey project. 
10 The APICS MRP performance measure falls into four categories, often identified as ABCD, in terms of 
use and firm implementation. Class A represents full implementation of MRP, include linkages to the 
firm’s financial system and human resource planning. Class B of MRP system is restricted in the 
manufacturing area including MPS (master production scheduling). Class C is confined only to inventory 
management. Class D is the lease degree of implementation where MRP is used for tracking data only. For 
more details, see, e.g., Moustakis (2000), pp. 7, or visit www.apics.org. We thank a referee for directing 
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H4-1: The benefits of ERP are increasing in the degree of implementation (Level). 
 
If, however, the diseconomies of module scope described above are relevant over the 
level of implementation employed by most firms, we may also observe: 
 
H4-2: At some level of implementation the benefits of increased module integration 
may decline (as coordination costs or other diseconomies set in). 
 
IV. Results and Interpretation 
 
In this section we report results on our analyses comparing adopters to non-adopters on a 
variety of performance metrics, comparing firm performance before, during and after 
adoption, and then modeling the adoption decision. 
 
IV. A. Comparison between Adopters and Non-Adopters 
 
Table 3 reports our basic regression results using the regression formulation described in 
Equation (1). Different measures of performance are regressed on an indicator variable of 
ERP adoption and controls for industry, size and time. Each column of Table 3 represents 
a different performance measure regression.  
 
Overall we find that, controlling for industry, ERP adopters show greater performance in 
terms of sales per employee, profit margins, return on assets, inventory turnover (lower 
inventory/sales), asset utilization (sales/assets), and accounts receivable turnover.  That is 
they are generating more revenue per unit of input and managing inventories and 
accounts receivable more aggressively.  The control variable for size is typically below 1 
suggesting that we are gaining some additional statistical power by utilizing Equation (1) 
for the analysis rather than using performance ratios as the dependent variable.  Due to 
the large sample in the reference population, our coefficients are precisely estimated with 
                                                                                                                                                                             
our attention to this, which results the classification and grouping of ERP implementation data for 
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t-statistics on the order of 20 for the various adoption measures. Given that most of our 
data is before and during implementation, this suggests that higher performing firms tend 
to adopt ERP and that their performance is at least maintained and possibly improved by 
ERP adoption.  The effect sizes tend to be relatively large, with marginal changes ranging 
from 6% to 22% (in absolute value).  In the following two sections, we will further 
analyze the differences in performance before and after implementation. 
 
The only negative performance ratio is return on equity. Given that debt/equity ratios are 
also lower and that return on assets shows a positive effect, it is likely that the reduction 
in return on equity is consistent with increased use of equity financing before and during 
implementation, rather than a decrease in performance. If firms perceive ERP 
implementation to be highly risky, one might expect firms would utilize less debt 
financing before and during implementation. Our data does not have many points post 
implementation so we cannot test whether firms increase leverage following the 
implementation (as would be expected when the financial risk of implementation has 
subsided). Thus, our results across the different metrics appear to paint a consistent 
picture that ERP has positive benefits on average and that firms behave as if the project 
were high risk. 
 
The results on performance are also confirmed by the regressions on productivity and 
Tobin’s q (Table 4).  Firms that adopt ERP are between 1.7% and 4.2% higher in 
productivity, depending on the specification when we do not control for the firm’s overall 
use of IT capital.  These coefficients become 2.7% and 1.7% when we include controls 
for computer usage (replicating the specifications used by Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1996; 
2000) – this suggests that we are not just identifying a correlation due to the fact that 
adopters of ERP are also likely to be more extensive users of information technology.  
Coefficients on the other production function factors are close to those found in previous 
work as well as their theoretically predicted values, lending additional credibility to these 
analyses. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
subsequent analyses.  
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Results of a simple Tobin’s q model (Table 4 columns 3 and 6) echo the previous results 
as well.  Our results suggest that firms that implemented ERP are worth approximately 
13% more than their non-adopting counterparts, controlling for assets, time and industry.  
Like the other analyses, this coefficient is highly significant, even when the sample is 
reduced to only firms in the Fortune 1000 or when we include IT capital separately in the 
regression – the difference becomes 2.7% (t=5.00, p<.001).   We therefore focus on the 
market value regressions controlling for IT capital use to be more conservative.   
 
Collectively, these results lend strong support to our first hypothesis – that ERP creates 
performance benefits – although caveats about timing and causality previously above 
certainly apply. 
 
IV. B. Prior, During and Post Adoption Business Impact 
 
Table 5 reports the results restricting the sample to only adopting firms and comparing 
financial metrics before, during and after implementation.  Because of the small number 
of data points post adoption, the post adoption estimates should be interpreted as the 
effects right at the end of the implementation period, while the “during adoption” 
estimates are probably closer to the average performance over the implementation period. 
 
Our results on performance analyses using the same specifications previously (Table 5) 
consistently show that firms have higher performance during the implementation than 
before or after, with the exception of accounts receivable turnover which improves both 
during and after implementation.  There is a substantial increase across almost all metrics 
during adoption, with some of this gain typically disappearing in the post-adoption 
period. This suggests that most of the gains previously measured are due to effects during 
the ERP implementation rather than driven by pre-existing firm characteristics. It also 
suggests that the paybacks begin to appear before the projects are completed – probably 
the most reasonable interpretation is that many of the components of an ERP adoption are 
completed and operational before the firm declares the project to be complete.  
Alternatively, it could be that many of the “belt-tightening” organizational changes such 
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as changes in inventory policy or reduction in the number of suppliers begin to generate 
gains fairly quickly, even if the more technical aspects of the project have not yet been 
completed. Performance may revert to pre-implementation levels (especially performance 
measured in bottom line financial terms) either because the gains indeed are reduced due 
to reduced future flexibility, or may simply suggest that the gains in performance are at 
least partially dissipated by long term maintenance costs. The fact that performance 
measures that are not affected by costs (such as accounts receivable turnover) continue to 
rise suggests that this indeed may be part of the explanation.  However, it is important to 
note that even if net performance gain at the end of the period were zero, gains were still 
achieved by ERP implementation; firms received an annual performance benefit for the 
1.5 years of an average implementation.  
 
Similar results are found in the productivity regressions (Table 6 columns 1, 2, 4 and 5), 
again using the same specifications employed in the previous section. There is a 
productivity gain during the implementation period, followed by a partial loss thereafter.  
When value added is used as the dependent variable, the gains are 3.6% during 
implementation with a loss of 4.7% for a net gain of –1.1% (t=.8, not significant).  
Results are somewhat stronger in the productivity specification with output as the 
dependent variable – gains of 2.4% offset by a smaller loss of 1.7%.  Because ERP 
implementation affects the materials/output ratio of firms, it may be that the increased 
flexibility of including materials in the regression (rather than subtracting them from 
output) explains these differences – this would generally favor the output-based 
specification as the more accurate measure. 
 
Interestingly, the Tobin’s q results (Table 6, columns 3 and 6) are consistent with 
adjustment rather than productivity decline as the explanation. During the 
implementation period, the firm receives an additional 6.3% (t=1.75, p<.1) percent 
market valuation.  This further increases at the end of implementation by 1.6% (t=.4, 
n.s.).  Although this change is not significant, there is a substantial change from pre- to 
post-implementation (7.9%, t=2.2, p<.01). This is consistent with Hypothesis 3-1 and 3-2 
(market value gains follow adoption and completion) although the strength of the post 
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adoption effect is quite weak.  However, it does suggest that the market discounts the 
value of ERP implementations in progress somewhat (about 20% of total value) relative 
to their long run value at completion. This is what would be expected if markets believed 
that there was substantial, but not overwhelming, risk of ERP projects.11 
 
A related interpretation of the Tobin’s q results is that the creation of intangible 
organizational assets is concentrated in the implementation period. Thus, the market is 
rewarding not the implementation per se, but the value of changed organizational 
structure, business process redesign, training and education of the workforce and other 
organizational assets that are not typically captured on the balance sheet (see 
Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang, 2000 for a discussion of this interpretation in a broader 
context). It could also represent an improvement in output value along intangible 
dimensions (service, information accuracy, timeliness), which is positively valued by the 
financial markets, but not well captured in the productivity analysis due to a failure of the 
output deflators to completely adjust for output quality. 
 
IV. D. Economies of Scope in ERP Adoption 
 
We can extend our productivity and market value specifications to investigate whether 
the extent of adoption – measured as the degree of functional integration.  We would 
generally expect benefits to increase in extent of adoption, at least up to a point where 
risks, technological constraints or inflexibility caused benefits to decline.  To capture 
different implementation levels we simply include dummy variables for each of the 
implementation levels (Levels 0, 1, 2A, 2B and 3).  We conduct this analysis using the 
full sample (including non adopters), although the general patterns are virtually identical 
if you restrict the sample to ERP adopters only and compare the different levels.  The 
                                                           
11 For example, if an ERP project were highly risky in the sense that it provided a +2% productivity gain 
with 50% probability and a –2% loss with 50% probability, the market should not reward the project until 
after successful completion.  If the numbers were +5% and +3% for success and failure respectively, a 4% 
gain might appear upon announcement, with the remaining amount (on the order of a 1%) appearing after 
successful completion.  We are not able to calculate these types of figures, because our data does not 
distinguish successful versus unsuccessful completion, although one would typically expect a firm to 
continue a project until it could be deemed successful (thus our completion metric might be highly 
correlated with project success). 
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baseline in the sample is non-adoption, so the coefficients on the dummy variables can be 
viewed as the difference between not adopting and adopting at that level. 
  
The results are presented in Table 7.  There is consistent pattern across all three analyses 
(productivity with value added, productivity with output and Tobin’s q).  For the most 
part, any ERP implementation at any level leads to increased performance, although the 
coefficient on Level 1 implementation (manufacturing, finance, and IS) is close to zero 
and sometimes negative (but not significant).  Level 2 implementations generally 
outperform Level 1 implementations, with the HR module adding more value than the 
project management module (these differences are all significant at p<.01).  Interestingly, 
full implementation (Level 3) actually shows a slightly reduced performance relative to 
2B.  This suggests that additional modules, in this case the project planning module, does 
not add enough value to justify the incremental complexity when four other module types 
are also implemented, even though it adds value on its own (the difference between Level 
1 and Level 2A). 
 
V. Conclusion and Future Directions 
 
Empirical data results have provided general support for our hypotheses.  We find that 
ERP adopters are consistently higher in performance across a wide variety of measures 
than non-adopters.  Our results suggest that most of the gains occur during the (relatively 
long) implementation period, although there is some evidence of a reduction in business 
performance and productivity shortly after the implementation is complete.  However, the 
financial markets consistently rewards the adopters with higher market valuation both 
during and after the adoption, consistent with the presence of both short term and long 
term benefits.  
 
Overall, this suggests that indeed ERP systems yield substantial benefits to the firms that 
adopt them, and that the adoption risks do not exceed the expected value, although there 
is some evidence (from analysis of financial leverage) that suggests that firms do indeed 
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perceive ERP projects to be risky.  There also appears to be an optimal level of functional 
integration in ERP with benefits declining at some level, consistent with diseconomies of 
scope for very large implementations, as one would typically expect.  While our data 
does not currently allow more detailed analysis of the exact pattern of adoption (due to 
lack of detailed data on the extent of deployment at the worker level) or the long-term 
impact on productivity (due to lack of long-term post implementation data at this time), 
both of these issues are promising areas for future research. 
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Table 1: Data Construction of Financial Performance Measures 
 
Ratio Definition Interpretation 
Labor Productivity Sales/# of Employees Profitability Measure: High ratio 
indicates more productive per employee  
 
Return on Assets 
Pretax Income/Assets Profitability Measure: High ratio 
indicates efficient operation of firm 
without regard to its financial structure 
Inventory Turnover COGS/Inventory Activity Measure: High ratio indicates 
more efficient inventory management 
Return on Equity Pretax Income/Equity Profitability Measure: High ratio 
indicates higher returns accruing to the 
common shareholders 
Profit Margin Pretax Income/Sales Profitability Measure: High ratio 
indicates high profit generated by sales  
Asset Turnover Sales/Assets Activity Measure: High ratio indicates 
high level of sales generated by total 
assets.  
Account Receivable 
Turnover 
Sales/Account 
Receivable 
Activity Measure: High ratio indicates 
effective management of customer 
payment 
Debt to Equity Debt/Equity Debt and Solvency Measure: The higher 
the debt ratio, the riskier the firm  
Tobin’s q Market Value/ 
Book Value 
High ratio indicates stock market is 
rewarding the firm 
 
Table 2: Sample Statistics 
 
 Full Population Fortune 1000/CI 
Population 
Total Observations 24037 5069 
Observations of ERP 
Adopters 
4069 1117 
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Table 3: Performance Ratio Regressions (Pooling Adopters and Non-Adopters) 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
ln(Sales) ln(Pretax 
Income) 
ln(cost of 
goods 
sold) 
ln(pretax 
income) 
ln(pretax 
income) 
ln(Sales) ln(Sales) ln(Debt) 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Interpretation Labor 
Prod. 
ROA Inventory 
Turnover 
ROE Profit 
Margin 
Asset 
Utilization 
Collection 
Efficiency
Leverage 
Implementation 
(1=implemented) 
0.267***
(0.0145) 
0.133***
(0.0195) 
0.0777***
(0.0192) 
-.0628*** 
(0.0164) 
.0984*** 
(0.0206)
0.123*** 
(0.0122) 
0.1955*** 
(0.0175) 
-.0796** 
(0.0235) 
ln(Employees) 0.891***
(0.0035) 
       
ln(Assets)  0.928***
(0.00442) 
   0.863*** 
(0.00270)
  
ln(Inventory)   0.728*** 
(0.00394)
     
ln(Equity)    0.938*** 
(0.00346) 
   0.852*** 
(0.00495)
ln(Sales)     0.971*** 
(0.00488) 
   
ln(Accounts Rcv)       0.718*** 
(0.00351) 
 
Control Variables Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
R2 0.825 0.769 0.712 0.8407 0.744 0.8779 0.7514 0.725 
Observations 24037 24037 24037 24037 24037 24037 24037 24037 
*** - p<.001;** -p<.01;  * - p<.05 
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Table 4: Productivity and Market Value Regressions (Pooling Adopters and Non-
Adopters) 
 
Dependent Variable ln(Value 
Added) 
ln(Output) ln(Value 
Added) 
ln(Output) ln(Market 
 Value) 
ln(Market 
Value) 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Implementation 
(1=implemented) 
0.042*** 
(0.00638) 
0.023*** 
(0.00400) 
0.0273** 
(0.00786) 
0.0174** 
(0.005) 
0.128*** 
(0.00829) 
0.026*** 
(0.0052) 
ln(Computer Capital)   0.0249 *** 
(0.00328) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
 0.0387*** 
(0.0042) 
ln(Ordinary Capital) 0.34*** 
(0.00271) 
0.182*** 
(0.00221) 
0.306*** 
(0.00468) 
0.133*** 
(0.00373) 
  
ln(Labor Expense) 0.647*** 
(0.00283) 
0.29*** 
(0.00188) 
0.659*** 
(0.00474) 
0.258*** 
(0.00317) 
  
ln(Materials)  0.514*** 
(0.00198) 
 0.586*** 
(0.00355) 
  
ln(Total Assets)     0.9824*** 
(0.00173) 
0.953*** 
(0.00517) 
Control Variables Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
R2 24037 24037 5603 5603 24037 5603 
Observations 0.9613 0.9849 0.9631 0.9847 0.9521 0.9414 
*** - p<.001;** -p<.01;  * - p<.05 
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Table 5: Performance Comparisons: Before, During and After ERP Implementation 
(Sample Restricted to Adopters Only) 
 
Dependent Variable ln(Sales) ln(Pretax 
Income) 
ln(cost of
goods 
sold) 
ln(pretax
income)
ln(pretax 
income) 
ln(Sales) ln(Sales) ln(Debt) 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Interpretation Labor 
Prod. 
ROA Inventory
Turnover
ROE Profit 
Margin 
Asset 
Utilization 
Collection 
Efficiency
Leverage 
Implementation  
Started (1/0) 
0.230*** 
(0.0460) 
0.185** 
(0.0695) 
0.1642** 
(0.0580) 
0.0757 
(0.0591) 
0.1872**
(0.0713)
0.0297 
(0.0320) 
-0.0354 
(0.0421) 
-0.0612 
(0.0867) 
Implementation 
Completed (1/0) 
0.1634**
(0.0478) 
-0.0734 
(0.0722) 
0.1258* 
(0.0605) 
-0.0853 
(0.0607) 
-0.0359 
(0.0731)
-0.0159 
(0.0329) 
0.0084 
(0.0432) 
0.1060 
(0.0888) 
ln(Employees) 0.967*** 
(.00640) 
       
ln(Assets)  0.941*** 
(0.00903)
   0.942*** 
(0.00417)
  
ln(Inventory)   0.906***
(0.00745) 
     
ln(Equity)    0.974*** 
(0.00765)
   0.95*** 
(0.0112) 
ln(Sales)     0.978*** 
(0.00961) 
   
ln(Accounts Rcv)       0.928*** 
(0.00551) 
 
Control Variables Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
R2 0.9055 0.823 0.8617 0.8765 0.8207 0.9564 0.9245 0.7663 
Observations 4069 4069 4069 4069 4069 4069 4069 4069 
*** - p<.001;** -p<.01;  * - p<.05 
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Table 6: Productivity and Market Value: Before, During, and After ERP Implementation 
(Sample Restricted to Adopters Only) 
 
Dependent Variable ln(Value 
Added) 
ln(Output) ln(Value 
Added) 
ln(Output) ln(Market 
 Value) 
ln(Market 
Value) 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Implementation  
Started (1/0) 
0.036 
(0.0241) 
0.024 
(0.0168) 
0.021 
(0.0250) 
0.025 
(0.0132) 
0.0630 
(0.0360) 
0.112* 
(0.0476) 
Implementation 
Completed (1/0) 
-0.047 
(0.0246) 
-0.017 
(0.0171) 
-0.069* 
(0.0289) 
-0.029* 
(0.0153) 
0.0161 
(0.0364) 
0.0927 
(0.0552) 
ln(Computer Capital)   0.0315 *** 
(.00668) 
0.0111*** 
(0.00355) 
 0.036*** 
(0.0111) 
ln(Ordinary Capital) 0.368*** 
(0.00821) 
0.111*** 
(0.00812) 
0.326*** 
(0.01) 
0.0947*** 
(0.00762) 
  
ln(Labor Expense) 0.635*** 
(0.00869) 
0.281*** 
(0.00622) 
0.645*** 
(0.011) 
0.241*** 
(0.00575) 
  
ln(Materials)  0.612*** 
(0.00720) 
 0.656*** 
(0.0067) 
  
ln(Total Assets)     0.9805*** 
(0.00445) 
0.9613*** 
(0.0118) 
Control Variables Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
R2 0.9715 0.9868 0.9740 0.9921 0.9479 0.9317 
*** - p<.001;** -p<.01;  * - p<.05 
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Table 7: Productivity Effect of Different Levels of Adoption 
 
Dependent Variable ln(Value 
Added) 
ln(Output) ln(Market 
 Value) 
Column (1) (2) (3) 
Non Adopter 0 0 0 
Any Module (Level 0) 0.0900*** 
(0.0207) 
0.0384** 
(0.0129) 
0.0436*** 
(0.0115) 
Manufacturing & Finance 
(Level 1) 
-0.00231 
(0.0108) 
0.00195 
(0.00678) 
0.0329*** 
(0.00601) 
Man., Fin. and Project 
Mgmt. (Level 2A) 
0.0358*** 
(0.0109) 
0.0248*** 
(0.00679) 
0.0689*** 
(0.00621) 
Man., Fin. and HR (Level 
2B) 
0.0816*** 
(0.0203) 
0.0908*** 
(0.0127) 
0.0917*** 
(0.0119) 
All (Level 3) 0.0746*** 
(0.0113) 
0.0206** 
(0.00710) 
0.0539*** 
(0.00648) 
ln(Ordinary Capital) 0.339*** 
(0.00271) 
0.182*** 
(0.00221) 
 
ln(Labor Expense) 0.647*** 
(0.00647) 
0.290*** 
(0.00188) 
 
ln(Materials)  0.514*** 
(0.00198) 
 
ln(Total Assets)   0.982*** 
(0.00174) 
Control Variables Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
R2 0.961 0.985 0.952 
Sample Full 
(including 
non 
adopters) 
Full 
(including 
non 
adopters) 
Full 
(including 
non 
adopters) 
*** - p<.001;** -p<.01;  * - p<.05 
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